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Is a restaurant liable when a customer is stabbed on its property? The Georgia Court of Appeals recently addressed this question and answered with a resounding “no.” A three-judge panel upheld a trial court’s decision awarding summary judgment to the restaurant.

The incident took place back in 2010. The victim was having dinner with his girlfriend and her family at a Mexican restaurant in Paulding County. At a nearby table, another customer–who had “consumed an unknown quantity of alcoholic beverages,” according to court records–began verbally harassing the group. The restaurant manager agreed to move the victim’s party to another table, but he declined to eject the drunken customer and, in fact, continued to serve him alcohol.

The customer continued to harass the victim’s group, at one point threatening a toddler. At this point, the restaurant manager asked the customer to leave. The manager later testified he was “a little afraid” of the customer but did not consider him an immediate threat to anyone in the restaurant.

In personal injury cases, trial juries are expected to employ their common sense and knowledge in determining liability. Expert testimony may provide a jury with specialized knowledge, but, as the Georgia Supreme Court has said in Cower v Widener, most “simple negligence” cases such testimony is not required “to establish a causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.” Recently, the Georgia Court of Appeals applied this principle to a dispute between an accident victim and his insurance company.

In February 2002, the victim was waiting in his car at an intersection. An unknown driver rear-ended him. The victim’s head slammed against the window. The victim exited his vehicle in a “dazed” state and proceeded to speak briefly with the other driver. However, before the victim could obtain any further vehicle or insurance information, the other driver fled the scene.

Shortly thereafter, the victim started receiving chiropractic treatment for lower back pain. Nine months later, an MRI revealed a herniated disk. The radiologist supervising the MRI concluded the injury was “possibly several months of age,” putting it within the time frame of the February accident.

Sometimes even judges get confused about basic traffic laws. In June, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict after finding the judge improperly instructed jurors about the law governing the right-of-way at a four-way stop sign. The case arose from a traffic accident in Gwinnett County where each driver blamed the other.

The plaintiff in this case testified that he arrived at the intersection–which had a four-way stop sign–first, stopped, and then proceeded to execute a left-hand turn. The defendant’s truck, approaching from the cross-road, failed to yield the stop sign and collided with the plaintiff’s vehicle in the intersection. The defendant, in contrast, said he arrived at the intersection a few seconds before the plaintiff and in fact made a complete stop before entering the intersection.

The police officer who took the accident report said the defendant was at fault for the accident, because “by state law when you both stop at the same time, you have to yield to the vehicle to your right.” At trial, however, the judge said this was wrong. Instead, the judge charged the jury as follows:

Cerebral palsy is a chronic, incurable condition that impairs a person’s motor functions. Most cases of cerebral palsy arise from a brain injury sustained before, during or shortly after a child’s birth. While cerebral palsy is usually not life-threatening, it is a permanent condition that affects the child for his or her entire lifetime.

The Georgia Court of Appeals recently reinstated a lawsuit, Nixon v. Pierce County School District, brought by a mother whose now-five-year-old child developed cerebral palsy. The woman was about 38 weeks pregnant when a school bus rear-ended her sedan. She was immediately taken to a hospital. The next morning, doctors decided to induce labor. There were no complications during birth, and the woman had, up to the point of the car accident, experienced nothing unusual with respect to her pregnancy.

Six months later, however, the woman started to notice developmental problems with her daughter. The child had difficulty controlling the right side of her body. At approximately one year of age, a pediatric neurologist diagnosed the girl with cerebral palsy.

On September 25, 2008, a driver heading west on Jackson Road (Georgia Highway 155) in Spalding County was struck by a white van traveling–well past the posted 55-mph speed limit–south on Johnny Cut Road. The subsequent collision killed the van operator and seriously injured the innocent driver of the other vehicle. Understandably, the victim filed a lawsuit to recover damages for his injuries.

What makes this case unusual is one of the defendants was the driver of a third vehicle. The victim identified this vehicle as running about 20-30 feet behind the van that collided with him. Subsequent evidence revealed the third vehicle had been following the van to a gas station. The victim testified the two vehicles were traveling at 65-70 miles per hour and likely ran a stop sign just prior to the accident. The driver of the third vehicle claimed he was only traveling around 40-45 miles per hour and that he stopped at the stop sign in question.

Georgia law recognizes joint liability of parties based on “tandem driving.” Put simply, if two cars are speeding together–say, in an illegal drag race–and one car causes an accident, the driver of the other car may also be held liable even if he or she was not a party to the accident. As the Georgia Court of Appeals has explained in Baxter v. Wakefield, liability exists when “there is an understanding” between the drivers “to reach a common destination and in doing so illegal speed is used and the cars are driven so closely together as to be practically in tandem.”

Sometimes there’s a deadly automobile accident where neither driver is legally at fault. The Georgia Court of Appeals recently made just such a finding with regards to a June 2010 highway accident just outside of Albany. While a trial judge thought there were issues for a jury to sort out, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals unanimously agreed the undisputed facts showed neither party could be held legally responsible.

The accident involved a woman driving her car on a northbound lane. A truck in the southbound lane suddenly veered across the turning lane and struck the car. The woman driving the car suffered a broken leg and other injuries. The man driving the truck sustained a head injury and could not recount the details of the accident to a police. It was later discovered the truck driver had suffered a stroke just before the accident, and he died a few weeks later.

The automobile driver sued the truck driver’s estate for negligence. The truck driver’s executor responded by filing a negligence counterclaim against the automobile driver. The trial judge refused both parties’ motions for summary judgment but allowed them to appeal that decision to the Court of Appeals.

An off-duty police officer providing security for an apartment building shoots an unarmed man who was simply delivering some medication to a disabled relative. Is the apartment building owner liable? Maybe, according to a recent decision by a divided Georgia Court of Appeals.

The victim in this case visited his aunt’s apartment building and parked in a handicapped-designated space. This aroused the suspicion of the off-duty officer. It was the officer’s first day working private security for the building. He had been hired by another police officer, who previously monitored the building alone.

After the victim completed his delivery and exited the building, the off-duty officer confronted him. The officer later testified that the victim panicked, entered his car and ingested what the officer (falsely) claimed was cocaine. The officer tried to physically block the victim’s car and repeatedly shouted him to stop. Ultimately, the officer smashed a window in the victim’s car and fired his weapon. The officer later claimed–again, falsely–that the victim was reaching for a gun.

The law often turns on the definition of a single word. In a recent decision, the Georgia Supreme Court unanimously defined the use of the word “occurrence” with respect to certain commercial insurance policies. The underlying case arose from allegations of faulty home construction.

Curiously, the faulty construction did not take place in Georgia, but California. Sixteen homeowners in that state filed a class action against their home builder over inadequately constructed foundations. The homeowners alleged the improper construction caused “terrible physical damage” to their properties.

Georgia came into the picture because of the home builder’s relationship with an insurance company providing a commercial general liability (CGL) policy subject to that state’s law. Normally, a CGL policy pays any legal liabilities arising from “bodily injury” or “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” in the specified coverage territory. In this case, the home builder’s CGL policy defined “occurrence” as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful condition.”

Under Georgia law, an automobile insurance policy must provide coverage for damages sustained in an accident with an uninsured motor vehicle. The amount of uninsured motorist (UM) coverage must be at least $25,000 for injury or death to one person ($50,000 to two or more persons) or equal to the policy’s overall limit on bodily injury liability coverage. The person taking out the insurance policy, however, may “affirmatively choose” an amount of UM coverage less than this maximum liability amount.

The Georgia Court of Appeals recently addressed a disagreement between an accident victim and his insurance company over whether he “affirmatively” chose less than the maximum amount of UM coverage presumed under state law. A three-judge panel held the insurance company had the burden of proof to show the insured person elected lesser coverage. This reversed a lower court’s previous ruling granting summary judgment to the insurance company.

“Affirmative” Action Does Not Mean Failure to Act

Is it okay for a used car salesman to lie to a customer about the condition of a vehicle? Yes, according to a recent decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals. On July 9th a three-judge panel unanimously upheld a lower court’s decision to dismiss a lawsuit against a car dealer who pulled a classic bait-and-switch. The court said it was the customer’s fault for believing the dealer’s claims.

The purchase in question took place in September 2011. The customer visited Payless Auto Deals looking for a “durable and reliable” used car. A salesman showed the customer a 2008 Honda Odyssey. The customer asked if there was anything wrong with the vehicle, that is had it been in a prior accident or suffered any damage? The dealer said the car was “clean and undamaged,” and produced a CARAFAX report to that effect.

While CARFAX reports are commonly used in assessing used car purchases, it’s important to understand that these reports are compiled by a private, for-profit company that accesses publicly available information. CARFAX reports are not sanctioned or regulated by the government (unlike, say, credit reports) and oftentimes do not reflect a vehicle’s complete accident history.

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