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Is an emergency room supervisor responsible for the malpractice of medical staff under his supervision? The Georgia Supreme Court recently looked at such a case and answered “no.” The justices unanimously reversed a Court of Appeals decision that would have allowed a woman to pursue a professional negligence case against a physician she claimed was partly responsible for her mother’s death.

Herrington v. Gaulden

In October 2008, 64-year-old Deloris Gaulden was admitted to Liberty Regional Medical Center in Hinesville. Gaulden had fainted while attending church and complained of tightness in her chest. Despite these symptoms, emergency department personnel did not perform certain routine procedures–i.e., giving Gaulden aspiring or running an EKG–until about an hour after her admittance. Approximately 90 minutes after her arrival, Gaulden suffered cardiac and respiratory arrest and died.

Although it’s commonly said that police “protect and serve,” a local government is not necessarily liable when its sworn officers fail to protect the general public from harm. In a 1993 decision, the Georgia Supreme Court adopted what became known as a “public duty doctrine.” This doctrine holds that a municipality can only be liable for nonfeasance–a police officer’s failure to act–if there’s a “special relationship” between the individual alleging negligence and the local government. As defined by the Georgia Supreme Court, this means the police must give the person “an explicit assurance” of protection or assistance that the person then relies upon to his or her detriment.

Stevenson v. City of Doraville

Recently, the Supreme Court considered the application of the public duty doctrine to a negligence lawsuit arising from a multi-car traffic accident in DeKalb County. During a rainstorm one evening, a driver on Interstate 285 experienced car trouble. The driver was in the lane nearest the median. He attempted to cross six lanes and bring his car onto the shoulder, but the car stalled in the middle of the road.

Under Georgia law, the winning party in a personal injury (or any other civil) lawsuit is usually not entitled to recover attorney fees or costs in connection with the litigation. As the Georgia Supreme Court noted in a 1941 decision, “Where there is a bona fide controversy for the tribunals to settle, and the parties can not adjust it amicably, there should be no burdening of one with the counsel fees of the other, unless there has been wanton or excessive indulgence in litigation.” The Georgia legislature may make exceptions to this rule, however, and one such example was the subject of a recent Georgia Court of Appeals decision.

Horton v. Dennis

This case began with a 2008 accident in Telfair County. A tractor trailer crossing Highway 31 near McRae crashed into a truck. The truck driver suffered serious injuries, including a mild traumatic brain injury and permanent erectile dysfunction.

The Georgia Court of Appeals recently upheld an award of over $2.6 million to a Fayetteville woman who suffered personal injuries while shopping at a local grocery store. By a 6-1 vote, the appeals judges rejected the store’s claim it lacked “actual or constructive knowledge” of the hazard that caused the woman’s injuries. The court also upheld a $150,000 award to the woman’s husband for “loss of consortium.”

The Georgia Supreme Court has said that in any “slip and fall” case against a property owner, the plaintiff must prove two things: First, that the owner had actual or constructive knowledge of a hazard; and second, that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the hazard despite “exercising ordinary care” for her own safety.

The Kroger Company v. Schoenhoff

Multi-vehicle accidents can pose complex questions regarding liability and insurance. The Georgia Court of Appeals recently addressed such a case. The appeals court rejected a trial court’s decision to summarily rule in favor of an insurance company that argued it should not have to provide “underinsured motorist” benefits to a policyholder.

Wade v. Allstate Fire and Casualty Company

The plaintiff in this case was injured in a multi-vehicle accident. The plaintiff initially sued five defendants–three other drivers involved in the accident, the employer of one of those drivers, and the parent of another driver. Three of the five defendants settled for a total of $30,000, an amount less than the maximum limits on their respective insurance policies. The other two defendants settled for an amount equal to their policy limits.

Expert testimony is often the key to winning a product liability case. If an expert witness proves inadequate, the plaintiff’s case may not survive long enough to get in front of a jury. To give a recent example, a federal judge in Savannah gutted most of a plaintiff’s case on summary judgment after determining his expert witness was unqualified and unreliable.

Grieco v. Tecumesh Products Company

The plaintiff worked as a repairman. In 2010, while making repairs to the compressor of a walk-in refrigerator, the compressor caught fire, burning the repairman’s hair, shoulder and arms. He subsequently sued the manufacturer of the compressor, alleging numerous product liability and breach of warranty claims. (Although the plaintiff’s claims are governed by Georgia state law, his case is being tried in federal court, as the manufacturer is an out-of-state corporation.)

Under Georgia law, a property owner must exercise “ordinary care” in maintaining safe conditions for persons invited onto the premises. If an invited person subsequently alleges he or she suffered an accident or injury due to the owner’s failure in this regard–a premises liability claim–then the burden is on the accuser to first prove the owner “had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard that caused the accident.” Once the accuser meets this burden, then the onus shifts to the owner to prove that it was the accuser’s action or inaction that caused the injury.

Daugharty v. FDIC

A pending case before a federal judge in Valdosta illustrates how premises liability law works in practice. The plaintiff here visited a local bank in 2011 to close an account. This was her first time visiting this particular branch of the bank. She entered and exited the bank through a walkway leading from the parking lot to the bank’s doors. On her return trip after exiting the bank, the woman “tripped over a protruding lip of concrete in the walkway, fell to the ground, and injured herself.”

In a typical premises liability lawsuit–such as a “slip-and-fall” case–the plaintiff must prove the property owner had “actual or constructive” knowledge of a hazardous condition on the property. But the property owner may attempt to defend itself by showing the plaintiff had “equal knowledge” of the hazard. If the plaintiff failed to exercise “ordinary care,” then the property owner won’t be held liable.

A recent Georgia Court of Appeals decision illustrates these principles. In Houston v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., the plaintiff was shopping early one morning at a Wal-Mart in Clayton County. The plaintiff pushed a shopping car through the store’s meat department. He walked over some flattened cardboard boxes left on the floor by an employee. When he turned the cart around and walked over those same boxes a second time, he slipped on the boxes and fell to the ground.

The plaintiff sued Wal-Mart and two of its employees for damages related to injuries he suffered in the fall. During discovery, Wal-Mart produced security camera footage showing the plaintiff had crossed the cardboard boxes once without incident before falling the second time. The plaintiff conceded this point in his own deposition. Based on this, the trial judge concluded the plaintiff had “equal knowledge” of the hazard posed by the cardboard boxes and granted summary judgment to Wal-Mart and the two employees. The plaintiff appealed.

Personal injury cases are usually tried in state courts under state law. But when the plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states–say, an individual plaintiff living in Georgia sues a company based in Florida–then the case may be removed to a federal court. The federal court must still decide the case based on state law. But federal rules govern procedural questions like the admission of evidence. This can sometimes lead to confusion, as the Eleventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in Atlanta recently found.

Cooper v. Marten Transport, Ltd.

In 2010, a husband and wife suffered serious back injuries after a tractor trailer collided with their car in Georgia. The couple sued the other driver and the company that owned the tractor trailer. As the defendants were not Georgia residents, they had the case removed from state to federal court.

Grade-crossing collisions–accidents where trains hit vehicles–are a surprisingly common occurrence in the U.S. railroad industry. Norfolk Southern, one of the largest railroads on the east coast, reported approximately 2,500 grade-crossing collisions over a four-year period–more than one accident per day. Railroad employees are frequently injured in these collisions, and unlike automobile-only accidents, their ability to recover damages may depend on federal, rather than state, law.

The Georgia Supreme Court recently addressed one such case. The plaintiff was a Norfolk Southern conductor. In 2007, the conductor’s train hit a logging truck in Dodge County. The conductor suffered severe back injuries and has not returned to work for the past six years.

The conductor sued Norfolk Southern alleging negligence. He claimed the company failed to train him properly “on how to protect himself in the event of a grade-crossing collision.” The conductor produced three experts, including a former Norfolk Southern trainmaster, who offered evidence tying the conductor’s injuries to a lack of proper training.

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