Under Georgia law, a landowner who invites others onto his or her property is liable for any injuries arising from the owner’s “failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.” This does not mean a property owner must anticipate every possible scenario where someone may be injured. Rather, a court will look at whether there is a “causal connection” between a landowner’s conduct and the injury alleged.

Allan v. Jefferson Lakeside, L.P.

In a recent case, the Georgia Court of Appeals examined the liability of a Marietta apartment complex owner for a tragic automobile accident which occurred on the property. The victim was a three-year-old boy who lived at the complex with his father. The child was riding in a rental car with his uncle, who was driving, and his father.

In Georgia, a dog owner can be held liable for an injury caused by his or her animal, provided the victim can demonstrate “the dog had the propensity to do the act that caused the injury and, if so … the owner had knowledge of that propensity.” This propensity test requires more than proof a dog exhibits generally “aggressive or menacing” behavior. Rather, as the Georgia Court of Appeals explained in a 1985 decision, “there should be an incident which would put a prudent man on notice to anticipate the event which occurred.”

Green v. Wilson

Recently, the judges on the Court of Appeals’ sparred over how narrowly to construe this “notice” requirement. The victim in this case worked as a house cleaner. The defendants owned a home cleaned by the victim and her co-workers. The homeowners also owned a border collie. According to the victim, it was normal procedure for her and the other house cleaners to “wait outside” until the owner locked the collie in a separate room. She testified the dog routinely “lunged, barked, and growled at the housecleaners.”

Thousands of Georgia residents take vacation cruises every year. You might wonder what happens if someone is seriously injured while at sea on such a cruise. For example, what legal standards apply when determining a ship operator’s negligence?

In a typical premises liability case—say, a slip and fall in a supermarket—the law of the state where the accident occurs govern any subsequent lawsuit. When a similar accident happens at sea, federal maritime law (sometimes called admiralty law) applies. In the United States, maritime law holds a ship owner owes a “duty of reasonable care” to protect its passengers from injury.

Sorrels v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.

How far may a court go in allowing jurors to personally examine evidence? The Georgia Court of Appeals recently addressed this question in the context of a medical malpractice case. Specifically, the court reviewed a trial judge’s decision to allow jurors to physically touch a plaintiff’s hands.

Piedmont Newnan Hospital, Inc. v. RA-085 Barbour

The plaintiff in this case went to a hospital in Newnan, Georgia, complaining of chest pains. Hospital personnel conducted a series of diagnostic procedures, including a “nuclear stress test.” This test requires the use of IV catheters to inject small amounts of nuclear material into a patient’s arm. This material helps trace the flow of blood into the patient’s heart at different intervals.

Many personal injury lawsuits come down to a “he said/she said” conflict: Two people get into an accident and each accuses the other of causing it. But what happens when one of the parties dies as the result of the accident, and there is no way to prove or disprove the survivor’s account of what happened? A federal judge in Georgia recently dealt with just this situation when sorting out the aftermath of a tragic boating accident.

Holmes v. Parker

In July 2009, three people boarded a 23-foot motorboat and traveled to Raccoon Island, a privately owned island in Chatham County. The three people included the boat’s owner, his female partner and another male passenger. While attending a party on Raccoon Island, the owner and his partner consumed alcohol and cocaine. During their return trip the following morning, the group’s boat hit a jetty on nearby Jekyll Island.

“Get your story straight” is good advice in life, and particularly when dealing with litigation. When a party to a personal injury lawsuit offers contradictory testimony, it can have a devastating effect on their case. In Georgia, courts enforce what is known as the Prophecy rule, which holds “when a party has given contradictory testimony, and when that party relies exclusively on that testimony in opposition to summary judgment, a court must construe the contradictory testimony against him.” This means if you offer two accounts of what happened, the judge must disregard the account most favorable to your case.

Whole Foods Market Group, Inc. v. Shepard

But it is not always obvious when a party has run afoul of the Prophecy rule. For example, a seven-judge panel of the Georgia Court of Appeals sharply divided recently on whether a defendant in a motor vehicle accident case fatally contradicted his own testimony. The majority sided with the plaintiff and the trial judge’s decision to award him partial summary judgment.

On July 13, the Georgia Supreme Court issued an interesting decision regarding the use of expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases. Georgia law requires a person alleging malpractice present an affidavit from “an expert competent to testify” as to the medical provider’s negligent act. Without such an affidavit, the trial court must dismiss the lawsuit.

Dubois v. Brantley

In this case, the plaintiff suffered serious complications following surgery to repair a hernia. This was an outpatient procedure, but a few days after the surgery, the plaintiff returned to the hospital, showing symptoms of pancreatitis. He later slipped into a coma and required nearly a month of intensive care and several additional surgeries.

As a general rule, a property owner is liable for any dangerous conditions that he knows about or reasonably should have known about. The former is known as “actual notice,” while the latter is “constructive notice.” This applies not just to private property owners, but also city and county governments, as a recent decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals illustrated.

City of Fitzgerald v. Caruthers

In this case, the victim himself was a municipal employee. While walking home one night from his job at the City of Fitzgerald’s public works department, a tree limb fell on the victim, knocking him unconscious and leaving him with serious injuries to his back, neck and eye.

In Georgia, most dog owners can be held liable if their animal bites or injures someone. Unfortunately, “most dog owners” do not include police officers, according to a recent Georgia Supreme Court decision. The justices reversed a lower appeals court which previously held a police officer could be sued for failure to control a police dog that injured an 11-year-old child.

Eshleman v. Key

The defendant in this case is a DeKalb County police officer who is responsible for the care of a police dog. The officer keeps the dog at her home in Walton County. In November 2011, the officer placed the dog in a portable kennel outside her home. Due to the officer’s apparent failure to secure the kennel door, the dog escaped and encountered the child of one of the officer’s neighbors. The dog subsequently attacked the child, seriously injuring his arm.

In Georgia, an employer is normally liable for the tortious acts of its employees. This is known as the doctrine of “respondeat superior.” But what happens when an employee injures someone outside the scope of their employment? A federal judge in Valdosta recently addressed such a situation.

United States Liability Insurance Company v. Jenkins

A couple enrolled their three-year-old child at a daycare center. One day, an employee of the daycare took the child out in her personal vehicle to go on a shopping trip. Neither the parents nor the daycare center owner gave permission for the employee to remove the child from the daycare center. While at a convenience store, the employee hit and injured the child with her personal vehicle.