Articles Posted in Auto Accidents

Dealing with insurance companies is one of the many unpleasant consequences of a motor vehicle accident. Insurers often look to dispose of claims quickly. And while that may also be in the victim’s interest, it’s important not to get railroaded by an overzealous insurer. A recent decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals highlights one such insurer who insisted there was a settlement when, in fact, there was not.

Kemper v. Brown

The victim in this case was driving her motorcycle in March 2012. She was hit by another vehicle. The other driver was clearly at fault–he had been drinking and driving recklessly.

An “uninsured motorist” policy provides coverage to the insured when he or she is the victim of an accident caused by another party that has insufficient resources to pay the full amount of any legal damages. In this context, “uninsured” also means under-insured. Thus, for example, if Driver A is in an accident caused by Driver B, and Driver B’s insurance only covers half of the damages awarded in a subsequent lawsuit, Driver A’s uninsured motorist carrier would pay the remaining half.

But what if Driver B is an agent of the State of Georgia? Normally, state agencies (and their employees) enjoy “sovereign immunity” from most civil lawsuits. The idea is that a state cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent, which is normally granted through legislation. However, when a local government in Georgia purchases liability insurance, sovereign immunity is waived up to the limit of said policy. What does this mean for accident victims with uninsured motorist coverage? A federal judge in Savannah recently attempted to answer this very question.

FCCI Insurance Company v. McLendon Enterprises, Inc.

If you’re in a motor-vehicle accident, it can matter a great deal who owns the offending vehicle, at least when it comes to assessing legal liability. The State of Georgia and its subsidiaries, including cities and counties, are immune from most lawsuits arising from the negligent operation of vehicles by their employees. This “sovereign immunity” can extend even to egregious cases of failure to maintain vehicles in proper working order, as a recent decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals illustrates.

City of Milledgeville v. Primus

Lucious Primus is an officer with the Georgia Department of Corrections. In 2006, Primus had to transport an inmate from a work detail in Milledgeville back to a nearby prison. The City of Milledgeville owned and maintained the bus Primus was driving. On this particular day, the brakes on the bus failed, causing Primus to drive off the road and hit a utility pole, injuring his neck and shoulders.

If you’ve been in an automobile accident due to another driver’s negligence, and that driver’s insurance company asks you to sign a limited liability release in exchange for receiving compensation, it’s important you understand exactly what future legal rights you may be signing away. Even if you think a release may not cover some future claims, a judge may not see it that way. A recent case in a Georgia federal court helps illustrate this point.

Watford v. Cowart

This case began with a car accident in Cook County in late 2012. The plaintiff accused the defendant of negligence and sought punitive damages and attorney’s fees in addition to compensatory damages. The defendant admitted negligence (and operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol) and her insurance company paid the plaintiff $300,000, the coverage limit on the policy. The plaintiff also has separate uninsured motorist coverage. In exchange for the $300,000, the plaintiff signed a limited liability release applicable to all claims for damages and injuries arising from the automobile accident, except to the extent provided by the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist policy.

Although it’s commonly said that police “protect and serve,” a local government is not necessarily liable when its sworn officers fail to protect the general public from harm. In a 1993 decision, the Georgia Supreme Court adopted what became known as a “public duty doctrine.” This doctrine holds that a municipality can only be liable for nonfeasance–a police officer’s failure to act–if there’s a “special relationship” between the individual alleging negligence and the local government. As defined by the Georgia Supreme Court, this means the police must give the person “an explicit assurance” of protection or assistance that the person then relies upon to his or her detriment.

Stevenson v. City of Doraville

Recently, the Supreme Court considered the application of the public duty doctrine to a negligence lawsuit arising from a multi-car traffic accident in DeKalb County. During a rainstorm one evening, a driver on Interstate 285 experienced car trouble. The driver was in the lane nearest the median. He attempted to cross six lanes and bring his car onto the shoulder, but the car stalled in the middle of the road.

Under Georgia law, the winning party in a personal injury (or any other civil) lawsuit is usually not entitled to recover attorney fees or costs in connection with the litigation. As the Georgia Supreme Court noted in a 1941 decision, “Where there is a bona fide controversy for the tribunals to settle, and the parties can not adjust it amicably, there should be no burdening of one with the counsel fees of the other, unless there has been wanton or excessive indulgence in litigation.” The Georgia legislature may make exceptions to this rule, however, and one such example was the subject of a recent Georgia Court of Appeals decision.

Horton v. Dennis

This case began with a 2008 accident in Telfair County. A tractor trailer crossing Highway 31 near McRae crashed into a truck. The truck driver suffered serious injuries, including a mild traumatic brain injury and permanent erectile dysfunction.

Multi-vehicle accidents can pose complex questions regarding liability and insurance. The Georgia Court of Appeals recently addressed such a case. The appeals court rejected a trial court’s decision to summarily rule in favor of an insurance company that argued it should not have to provide “underinsured motorist” benefits to a policyholder.

Wade v. Allstate Fire and Casualty Company

The plaintiff in this case was injured in a multi-vehicle accident. The plaintiff initially sued five defendants–three other drivers involved in the accident, the employer of one of those drivers, and the parent of another driver. Three of the five defendants settled for a total of $30,000, an amount less than the maximum limits on their respective insurance policies. The other two defendants settled for an amount equal to their policy limits.

Bad Boy Enterprises manufactures and sells golf carts modified to function as off-road vehicles. These “Bad Boy Buggies” are primarily marketed to outdoor enthusiasts and hunters. They are also the subject of an ongoing federal lawsuit in Georgia over their safety.

The plaintiffs in this case are the parents of a minor. The child was 13 years old when her parents allowed her to operate a Bad Boy Buggy owned by a family friend. The child had driven the vehicle on several prior occasions, always with her parents permission. On the day in question, she was driving the buggy around a looping gravel driveway with a friend sitting in the passenger seat.

According to court records, the buggy would suddenly accelerate even when constant pressure was maintained on the accelerator pedal. On this particular day, the child applied the brake as the vehicle entered a turn. The vehicle continued to accelerate, however, and eventually tipped over, severing the child’s left foot and part of her leg.

Sometimes even judges get confused about basic traffic laws. In June, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict after finding the judge improperly instructed jurors about the law governing the right-of-way at a four-way stop sign. The case arose from a traffic accident in Gwinnett County where each driver blamed the other.

The plaintiff in this case testified that he arrived at the intersection–which had a four-way stop sign–first, stopped, and then proceeded to execute a left-hand turn. The defendant’s truck, approaching from the cross-road, failed to yield the stop sign and collided with the plaintiff’s vehicle in the intersection. The defendant, in contrast, said he arrived at the intersection a few seconds before the plaintiff and in fact made a complete stop before entering the intersection.

The police officer who took the accident report said the defendant was at fault for the accident, because “by state law when you both stop at the same time, you have to yield to the vehicle to your right.” At trial, however, the judge said this was wrong. Instead, the judge charged the jury as follows:

On September 25, 2008, a driver heading west on Jackson Road (Georgia Highway 155) in Spalding County was struck by a white van traveling–well past the posted 55-mph speed limit–south on Johnny Cut Road. The subsequent collision killed the van operator and seriously injured the innocent driver of the other vehicle. Understandably, the victim filed a lawsuit to recover damages for his injuries.

What makes this case unusual is one of the defendants was the driver of a third vehicle. The victim identified this vehicle as running about 20-30 feet behind the van that collided with him. Subsequent evidence revealed the third vehicle had been following the van to a gas station. The victim testified the two vehicles were traveling at 65-70 miles per hour and likely ran a stop sign just prior to the accident. The driver of the third vehicle claimed he was only traveling around 40-45 miles per hour and that he stopped at the stop sign in question.

Georgia law recognizes joint liability of parties based on “tandem driving.” Put simply, if two cars are speeding together–say, in an illegal drag race–and one car causes an accident, the driver of the other car may also be held liable even if he or she was not a party to the accident. As the Georgia Court of Appeals has explained in Baxter v. Wakefield, liability exists when “there is an understanding” between the drivers “to reach a common destination and in doing so illegal speed is used and the cars are driven so closely together as to be practically in tandem.”

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